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THE MANAGER SACK RACE GAME
KJETIL K. HAUGEN
Abstract. This article applies game theory to explain why football clubs have a ten-
dency to sack their managers when relegation is a realistic option. As opposed
to coach succession literature, which typically reports contradiction between the-
ory and practice, this article produces credible explanations for this “problem”. In
addition, observations indicating accelerated manager replacements in modern pro-
fessional football are also easily explained. Derived Nash equilibria are also quite
robust to parameter assumptions and hence the possible variations.
1. Introduction
Research literature related to the effects of leader replacement in business has
grown considerably in the recent years. Of special interest in this article is leader
replacement in sports and particularly coach replacement in association football
or soccer1. This branch of research literature, often designated coach succession
literature, studies possible performance changes caused by replacing managers
(head coaches, field managers or trainers are different designations for this job).
According to some relevant literature surveys, [5], [1] and [6], replacement of
the manager in a football team is – according to Gammelsæter in [5] – “not of
much help”.
Furthermore, Bridgewater [3] argues that football managers seem not only to be
replaced often, but over time even more often. He based this proposed accelerating
effect on data from Premier League indicating that the manager’s average tenure
decreased from about 3 years in 1992–1993 to 1.5 years in 2007–2008.
Without asking the obvious question, Gammelsæter concludes in [5] that there
is a contradiction between theory and practice. In this author’s opinion, a clearer
question needs to be addressed;
If theory concludes unambiguously that replacing the manager in
football has no significant positive effect, why do football clubs, and
even in accelerated speed, keep on changing their managers?
Surely, one simple approach would be to hypothesize that there are serious
flaws in the theory. After all, empirical before-and-after manager replacement
measurements have methodological issues. Weel [9] discusses these issues in an
interesting article. He claims that what one really would like to measure is the
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1The term football is used in the rest of the article.
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situation where the same team plays the same matches with the old manager
and the new manager simultaneously. Then, and only then, the real effect of
manager replacement can be measured. Of course, the control group (playing
in parallel with the old manager) is practically unfeasible. Still, he argues that
many teams are in relegation battle situations, some change the manager, some
do not, and it should be possible to construct some approximative control groups.
Furthermore, he reports that the results are robust for different control group
definitions. Unfortunately, the results do not differ much from the many empirics
reported above. Admittedly, he reports significant performance improvements
after replacing managers. However, similar improvements are also present in the
control groups. Hence, the net effect does not contradict the existing results.
This article suggests a different path. Could it be that football clubs, and in this
context their boards, do not (and should not) base their decision on replacing a
manager on whether historic managerial replacements in Barcelona or Manchester
City provided the desired effect? Or, could it be that such a decision should (and
must) be made based on information relevant for the actual situation the club
is facing? Perhaps the quality of your team and manager as well as the cost of
replacement and potential effects on survival probabilities are more relevant infor-
mation? Not to mention similar information related to your closest competitors,
those you need to gather more points than, to avoid relegation.
These questions call for a game theoretic model. In subsequent sections and
subsections, such a model is defined (Section 2), analyzed (Section 3) and discussed
(Section 4). Section 5 concludes. As will be shown, such a pathway does not create
contradictions between theory and practice. On the contrary, this theoretical
pathway constructs a theory perfectly in line with practice.
2. A game model
2.1. Notation
The notation used in the game model describes a situation where two professional
football teams battle to avoid relegation in a league. The following notation is
used:
CC : The cost of changing (replacing) the manager in either club.
In reality, the CC-parameter will be team, league and country dependent. However,
without loss of generality, a single valued (one dimensional) CC is assumed here.
VS : The value of staying in the top league.
VR : The value of moving to a lower division – the value of relegation.
TA : Team A, player 1 in the game.
TB : Team B, player 2 in the game.
K : Decision – keep the manager for both teams.
C : Decision – change (replace) the manager for both teams.
pKA : Pr(Team A survives the relegation battle | Keeping the manager).
pKB : Pr(Team B survives the relegation battle | Keeping the manager).
pCA : Pr(Team A survives the relegation battle | Changing the manager).
pCB : Pr(Team B survives the relegation battle | Changing the manager).
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ε : A small positive real number.
εA : A small positive real number.
εB : A small positive real number.
N : Number of teams in the given league.
2.2. Assumptions
Now, the situation at hand may be defined as follows: The two teams TA and
TB have some (relatively few) games left in the season, and (for this case without
loss of generality), the team ending last is relegated, while the team ending second
last stays in the league. Given the relatively short time span as well as a limited
number of matches left, not many other options to improve and get necessary
points than changing the manager are available for the two teams2. That is, both
teams face a limited set of possible decisions (in the short run) – keeping or sacking
the manager. As the notation subsection above indicates, these two decisions are
named K and C.
So, the two teams (TA and TB) play a game involving choosing either K or C.
The information structure in the game is assumed simple. Again, given the short
time horizon assumption, it seems reasonable to assume that both players make
their decisions without information related to their opponent’s choice. That is, we
investigate a simultaneous game, a game with complete and imperfect information.
Surely, a managerial change in a football club is no secret. So, an alternative
sequential formulation is feasible. However, it seems a bit too risky for one club
deliberately to wait for the other club to make such a decision. Furthermore, if the
other club’s decision is not to change the manager, such a decision is unobservable
for the opponent. Hence, the above “one-shot game” assumption seems reasonable.
Let us furthermore assume that the two teams (TA and TB) are located at
the bottom of the league table in a league with N teams. Let us also assume
that, before the upcoming game is played, TA has the better position (located at
position N − 1), while TB holds the last place. Given this assumption, it seems


















2In a longer time perspective, more options to improve performance is of course available
– buying and selling players for instance. However, today’s situation with few and relatively
short transfer windows, typically not timely located at the end in the season, makes this (limited
decision space for the teams) a reasonable assumption.
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The interpretation of inequalities (2.1) and (2.2) are simply the rationality of the
players of the game. It seems very hard not accept that football teams believe
that a managerial change leads to better sport performance. Nobody sacks the
manager if they plan to replace him/her with a manager producing worse team
performance3.
The two values, VS and VR, which are assumed to be monetary, denotes the
value of staying in the league and the value of being relegated respectively. In most
leagues, at least the most important ones, it seems safe to assume that VS  VR.
See for instance [8], which reports that relegation from the Premier League may
cost over $375 million4.
The cost of a manager change, (CC), will also (in practice) depend a lot on the
situation. Football managers, like football players, normally have a time-limited
contractual obligation to a club. And, if the club needs to brake this contract,
monetary compensation will normally be necessary. Dupare [4] tells some stories
about especially costly managerial changes in Premier League football clubs (with
replacement costs ranging from £11 million to £18 million), as such perhaps not
representing average costs. Still, although these numbers are high, they are of
different magnitudes than relegation costs. As a consequence, it is reasonable to
assume that CC  VS , CC  VR as well as CC  VS − VR.
In order to complete the game formulation, risk neutral teams and expected
value maximization as objectives for both club are assumed.
2.3. Modeling
Given all assumptions made in Subsection 2.2, the normal form game in Figure 1
is easily formulated.
As can be observed in Figure 1, the players’ pay-off’s are simply calculated
as expected values of being relegated or staying in the league with additional
subtracted costs, CC , if the team has chosen to change manager.
3. Analyzing the game model
3.1. The {C, C} Nash Equilibrium
Analyzing the game (examining Nash Equilibria (NEs)) of Figure 1 is straightfor-
ward. The most interesting outcome here, existence of the {C, C} NE, is examined
first.





















3There could of course be special (and quite improbable) situations where the existing man-
ager is too expensive for today’s budget. That is, you replace the manager due to manager costs,
but such sitations are very rare, and not intended to be of relevance in this gaming situation.
4Obviously, such estimates are both uncertain and very simplified. Additionally, the club,
league and country has a great impact on actual numbers. Still, in most situations, relegation in
football is costly, or as we state it here: VS  VR.
















































































Figure 1. A normal form game formulation.
Applying assumption (2.1) we find:
pCA > p
K
A ⇒ pKA + εA = pCB .














Some simple algebra gives:
pKAVS + εAVS + VR − pKAVR − εAVR − CC > pKAVS + VR − pKAVR
and




Now, a completely similar derivation can be performed for TB – defining p
C
B >
pKB ⇒ pKB + εB = pCB and substitution into inequality (3.2) – to produce εB >
CC
VS−VR . At this point, it is convenient to simplify
5 and assume that εA = εB = ε





to secure the {C, C} NE.
5This simplification is made to obtain a single expression for the inequality defining the NE.
Furthermore, the actual meaning of the ε-term, which is the probabilistic gain of changing the
manager to stay in the league, is probably almost the same for the two fairly bad teams anyway,
located at the very bottom of the table as they are.
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3.2. Uniqueness of the {C, C} NE
In the previous subsection (Subsection (3.1)), it was shown that the outcome {C, C}
is a NE. Or, in equilibrium, both teams choose to replace their manager. However,
the possible uniqueness was not proven. In this subsection, we will investigate the
possible uniqueness properties of this NE6.
Assume now that inequality (3.3) is satisfied. Given this assumption, it is
straightforward to realize that the outcomes {C,K} and {K, C} are impossible as
candidates for NE-status. This is easy to see by realizing that should {K, C} be a




















Comparing inequalities (3.4), (3.5) with (3.1), (3.2) it is readily observed that
the pairs are equal apart from the inequality sign. Then, given the assumption of
a satisfied (3.3), neither (3.4) nor (3.5) can be satisfied, and hence, neither {C,K}
nor {K, C} are NEs in the game.
Then, the only remaining possible (pure strategy) NE candidate is {K,K}.
Again, given the assumption of (3.3), we are looking at a potential situation with
2 pure NEs7, and as most standard text books in Game Theory8 might name





















We observe readily that (3.6) = (3.4) and (3.7) = (3.5). As a consequence,
the“Stag-Hunt” game is impossible in this game, and we can conclude that the




the game has the unique pure strategy NE: {C, C} (3.8)




the game has the unique pure strategy NE: {K,K}. (3.9)
That is, the game produces only two alternative NE’s. Either both teams keep, or
both replace their manager. This particularly simple game prediction will prove
relevant for the discussion in Section 4.
6In the argument following, it is assumed that possible equalities between various pay-off
expressions in Figure 1 are non-existent. In practice the probabilities of such equalities are
certainly very low, so this seems to be a fair assumption.
7This case also contains a third NE in mixed strategies. This is, however, of no importance
here.
8See for instance [2].
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4. Discussion
4.1. The probable NE
At this point, it will prove convenient to return to a discussion on the potential
practical values of the parameters in inequality (3.3), determining the NE.
First, the value of relegation (defined as VS − VR here) was briefly discussed in
Subsection 2.2. There, the value of relegation from Premier League was reported
to be at least $375 million (or around £315 million in today’s currency) for the
upcoming 20/21 season. This estimate was based on a statement by an Aston
Villa executive. Clearly, this is a highly uncertain estimate and perhaps strongly
linked to the actual club and its position at the time. Still, as it is based on
Premier League prize money as well as TV-revenue, it defines the type of club.
This is not a top 5 or 6 club that does not fight relegation, but fighting to enter the
European scene – Champions or Europa League. Such a club will most certainly
have far higher costs of relegation. Surely, the value of competing in the top
level European tournaments is also highly dependent on the actual team and the
country it comes from, but some numbers are transparent and available. According
to [7], the upcoming season’s (20/21) winner of CL would receive a cash-flow of
£74 million if all group stage matches were won. In addition, a certain share of
the so-called “Market Pool” money will also be added. For the upcoming season
this is estimated to be £263 million. In addition to this, added sponsor money,
shirt sales etc. will most certainly also be lost if (say) Manchester United faces
relegation to the championship.
The point is simple. If a better club (not Aston Villa) faces relegation, the
cost of relegation will be significantly higher than the estimate of £315 million
discussed above. A total cost of (say) £500 million does not seem unreasonable.
The point of this being practical, is to try to judge the magnitude of the right-
hand side of inequality (3.3). The reason for re-estimating the “Aston Villa”
to a “Manchester United” estimate is to be able to compare with the relevant
information on the denominator in the fraction, CCVS−VR . Dupare [4] lists the 5
most expensive manager switches in Premier League history. They range from
£11 to £18 million. Given that these values may be seen, at least as an upper
bound on a managerial replacement today, we have comparable numbers. Say,
for instance, that two clubs in our game formulation expect that they (at worst)
may need £15 million9 to replace their managers, the fraction can be computed
as: CCVS−VR =
15
500 = 0.03 or more conveniently; 3%.
This means that in order to satisfy inequality 3.3, ε > 0.03 or in more practical
terms; if you are a member of the board in Manchester United, atypically struggling
to stay in Premier League, you are facing the following decision: If we can replace
our manager with a new one that increases the probability of staying in the league
by merely 3%, we should do it. Such a decision seems easy to make, in a situation
where your beloved club literally stands in front of the cliff.
Surely, the argumentation above is highly uncertain and involves too many
practical short cuts. Still, the fact that the cost of relegation must be much higher
than the managerial replacement must be correct. After all, we constantly observe
9Based on a simple average estimate: 11+18
2
= 14.5 ≈ 15.
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that football clubs change their managers. For instance, this season in Norway
(2020) , before half of the matches have been played, 3 out of 16 team mangers
have already been sacked.
That is, it does seem very probable to expect that football teams, given a rea-
sonable belief that the formulated model reasonably represents reality, quite often
will replace their managers. It is not a stupid decision after all. It is on the con-
trary a very rational decision, even if all empirical information in the world tells
them that it does not help.
The above arguments were based on a case from UK Premier League. What
about other leagues in other countries? Of course, the numbers may and will
change. In less valuable leagues, these numbers are definitely different, and typ-
ically significantly smaller. However, the point is not the absolute values of the
numbers, but the fact that VS−VR  CC and consequently, CCVS−VR is a small num-
ber. This seems to be the case in most other countries other than UK, and this
model may prove an interesting explanation why football teams tend to change
their managers when performance problems occur globally.
Surely, we have modeled a situation involving two teams struggling to avoid
relegation. It is important to be aware of the fact that football teams may have
other and very good other reasons to change managers. Such situations, involving
for instance end of contracts, health issues, age, general performance issues, salary
costs and so on are not explicitly modeled here. That is, the main focus here, is
a situation where relegation is a probable outcome.
4.2. Game model discussion and critique
As the previous section indicates, the validity of the arguments and the resulting
NE is perhaps more focused on the actual game model and its assumptions as
opposed to the actual numbers deciding the Nash equilibrium.
One obvious simplification in the model is the number of teams and, hence,
players. Surely, the choice of two teams instead of three or four is not random.
After all, in the most practical leagues, more than one team is relegated; typically
2–4 depending on some play-off structure. As such, the choice is made to simplify
the mathematical analysis, but similar modeling and arguments could still be
performed for two and two teams at a time, and is seems very unlikely that the
results should change dramatically.
The fact that we simplified by setting εA = εB = ε in Subsection 3.1, may
(typically) complicate the structure of NEs in the game. It may for instance open
up for “Chicken-type” situations, that is non-coordinating solutions with potential
NEs such as {C,K} or {K, C}. Still, as briefly discussed previously (also in Subsec-
tion 3.1), the probability that teams struggling with each other to avoid relegation
are quite equal in quality and wealth (or other possible relevant dimensions) is
quite high. After all, Manchester United and Liverpool are quite seldom facing
the relegation option.
The choice of a simultaneous (imperfect information) game can of course also be
discussed. It was done briefly in Subsection 2.2. The point that the K decision is
unobservable before the league ends is a good argument for not choosing a different
information structure in the game formulation. Still, a situation where one team
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suspects that the other team may have plans to replace their manager (just like we
have) is relevant and definitely interesting. However, such an assumption would
lead to far more complex formulations involving for instance espionage decisions.
In reality, most actual practical games will contain elements calling for games
of incomplete information. Here, the game formulation in Figure 1 implicitly
assumes that all information in Figure 1 is available for both players10. In the real
world one could perhaps expect that TA should have information about (or at least
principally information available to estimate) PKA , P
C
A, but having the same type
of information on your closest opponent, in this case, TB may be harder to accept.
As such, a game model of incomplete and possibly asymmetric information seems
clearly relevant. This a very different approach and was not the intention of this
article – still, clearly of interest.
However, intuitively, if you do not know your opponent, it seems reasonable to
expect even more tendency to fire the coach11 and, hence, even stronger results
than the complete information version presented here.
4.3. NE structure
The obvious simplicity of the game solution, as indicated by the inequalities (3.8)
and (3.9) in Subsection 3.2, is interesting. The fact that our game produces a sin-
gle pure unique NE tells a history of predictive power. That is, a game with
such a solution structure indicates a higher degree of trust in the solution than
alternative outcomes – “Stag-Hunt” or “Chicken games” for instance.
Actually, the situation provides an even stronger predictive power. In Figure 2,
the best reply functions for both players TA and TB are shown with (red) ellipses
and rectangles for players TA and TB , respectively. These best reply functions are
calculated under the assumption that inequalities (3.1) and (3.2) (leading to (3.3))
are satisfied.
As can be observed from the best reply functions in Figure 2, both players play
dominant strategies in this game. That is, no matter what decision your opponent
takes, you will always choose to change your manager – the C option. This is
often referred to as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. A NE in dominant
strategies is (logically) a subset of NEs with especially strong predictive power.
After all, if the player you play against, always does the same, no matter what
choice you make, it is easy to find your choice, and the predictive power in such
situations is especially strong.
To sum up, given that the formulation is accepted, the game solution provides
the strongest possible predictive power in game theory. Or in more popular terms,
it is (at least) no doubt related to the game solution. It should be a very clear
indication of what rational players would and should do in the game.
10This is a consequence of the choice of a complete information game formulation,
11The actual NE contingency consequences will of course depend on the information assump-
tions on opponent types. But if one assumes some kind of symmetry on the quality of the teams,
such an outcome seems probable. Of course to sort out these things scientifically, an incomplete

















































































Figure 2. Best reply functions.
5. Conclusions
This article has demonstrated that a game theoretic model may produce coherence
between theory and practice in football coach succession. The model shows by
some rough estimates of relevant parameters that the probable (and rational)
decision for a football club in serious trouble is to replace their manager. That is,
football boards are not necessarily fools, as alternative theory may indicate. On
the contrary, they are perfectly rational, given that the model assumptions used
are acceptable.
Furthermore, indications of acceleration effects (i.e. modern football consumes
managers even faster than before) can be easily accounted for as the relegation
costs are imperative in establishing NEs. The fact that the relegation costs are
decisive in securing the essential model result (see inequality (3.3) and that high
relegation costs secure the direction of the inequality, means that if modern football
produces higher relegation costs, more manager replacements is a definitive result.
Finally, the results are robust in the sense that NEs are unique and pure. In
addition, the NEs are of a dominant strategy type, which should make them even
easier to believe being the actual game prediction.
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